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"Gram Shop" Liability: Holding Drug Dealers
Civilly Liable for Injuries to Third Parties
and Underage Purchasers
Michael E. Bronfint
Early on a fall morning in 1990, a 37-year-old dancer re-
turned home after dropping off her two children at school. ' Be-
fore she could react, an intruder charged her.2 He beat and
stabbed her more than twenty times, leaving her to die on the
kitchen floor.' Fortunately, the dancer, Donna Prete, survived
and the attacker, Anthony Gentile, was arrested. Gentile
confessed to the crime but explained that he was high on cocaine
at the time of the assault.4 He claimed that a drug dealer, Ed-
ward Laudano, sold him the cocaine that caused him to attack
Prete.5 Because Gentile was unable to pay damages, should
Prete be able to recover from Laudano for the damages caused by
the drug dealer's illegal sale, or must the injury lie where it has
fallen?
The common law, federal statutes, and almost all state laws
do not impose civil liability upon drug dealers.' Thus, innocent
victims-third parties and underage purchasers'-injured by the
sale of illegal narcotics have been unable to recover from the
drug dealer. By failing to hold drug dealers civilly liable, the law
forgoes an opportunity to force drug dealers to internalize the
t B.A. 1990, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
' Rosemary P. McNicholas, Judge Allows Strict-Liability Claim Against Alleged Drug
Dealer; Jury Will Decide if Selling Cocaine is an Ultrahazardous Activity, The Connecticut
Law Tribune 1 (Feb 15, 1993).
2 Id.
3 Id.
Id.
McNicholas, The Connecticut Law Tribune at 1 (cited in note 1).
On February 24, 1994, Michigan enacted the first state law holding drug dealers in
the state civilly liable for injury resulting from drug sales. Mich Stat § 691.160 et seq
(West 1994). See notes 41, 60. Additionally, the case described above, Prete v Laudano,
1993 WL 21417 (Corn Super 1993), is currently being litigated in Connecticut. See notes
1-5 and accompanying text.
' The term "underage purchaser" as used in this Comment refers to drug purchasers
who have not yet reached the age of majority. The alternative term, "minor drug purchas-
er," is confusing because it can be misunderstood to refer to one who purchases only a
small amount of drugs, or to an infrequent drug purchaser.
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costs of their illegal activities. Because the direct culprits, the
drug users, frequently do not have the financial resources to
compensate their victims, a law holding drug dealers liable for
injuries to third parties would both deter the sale of illegal nar-
cotics and allow these victims to recover more fully for their inju-
ries. Similarly, a law holding drug dealers liable to underage
purchasers would deter sales to these innocent parties.
This Comment proposes a standard that would hold drug
dealers civilly liable for injuries to innocent parties-specifically
third parties and underage purchasers of drugs-while barring
recovery for adult drug purchasers. Part I examines the common
law's failure to hold drug dealers liable for injuries caused to
third parties and underage drug purchasers. Part II proposes a
legislative solution allowing third parties and underage drug
purchasers to recover from drug dealers for their injuries. Final-
ly, Part III explores the parallels between modern common law
tort liability and the proposed statute, emphasizing the proposed
statute's ability to achieve the dual public policy objectives of
deterring drug sales and fully compensating innocent victims for
their injuries.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE COMMON LAW TO PROVIDE RECOVERY
FOR THIRD PARTIES AND UNDERAGE PURCHASERS
The common law does not allow third parties or underage
drug purchasers to recover damages from a drug dealer for inju-
ries caused by the illegal sale of drugs. At first glance, three
common law tort doctrines seemingly allow recovery: (1) strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activity; (2)"strict product
liability; and (3) traditional negligence liability. Each of these
torts, however, contains loopholes allowing drug dealers to escape
liability. Thus, traditional common law doctrines fail both to
deter potential drug dealers and to provide adequate means of
recovery to the victims of these dealers.
A. Abnormally Dangerous Activity
Third parties and drug purchasers may not recover damages
from a drug dealer under the tort doctrine of liability for abnor-
mally dangerous activity. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
imposes strict liability on those who engage in an abnormally
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dangerous activity.8 The Restatement lists six factors relevant to
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm
to the person[1
(b) the likelihood that the harm that results from [the
activity] will be great;
(c) an inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care;
(d) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage;
(e) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on; and
(f) the extent to which [the activity's] value to the com-
munity is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.9
In order to recover, a victim must establish that the cumulative
weight of these factors demonstrates that the activity at issue is
abnormally dangerous. °
Under the Restatement standard, the sale of narcotics ap-
pears to qualify as an abnormally dangerous activity for the
following reasons: (a) drugs are inherently dangerous substances
that can produce permanent mental and physical injury;1 (b)
because they impair judgment and motor skills, drugs may lead
to accidents, injuries, and violent outbursts;12 (c) given the na-
ture of these substances, it is impossible to eliminate the risks
involved in the recreational use of drugs;13 (d) while the sale of
illegal drugs is prevalent, these sales cannot be described as
"common" and remain prohibited by law; (e) except in certain
professionally supervised medical contexts, no "appropriate" place
or location exists for indulging in the use of illegal drugs; and (f)
through legislative enactment, communities have determined
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977).
9 Id at § 520.
"' "Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the
court, upon consideration of all the factors listed in this Section, and the weight given to
each that it merits upon the facts in evidence." Id at § 520 comment 1.
" Ian R. Tebbett, A Pharmacist's Guide to Drugs of Abuse, 134 Drug Topics 58 (Sept
3, 1990). Drug use can produce vomiting, diarrhea, weight loss, loss of attention and con-
centration, impaired short-term memory, lack of coordination, convulsions, cardiac failure,
cerebral hemorrhaging, paranoia, psychosis, flashbacks, depression, violence, amnesia,
and death. Id.
2 Id. Barbiturates, lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD"), and phencyclidine
phenylcyclohoxyl piperidine ("PCP") all have these side effects.
13 Id.
345]
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that the sale of illegal drugs has no legitimate value to society
and, therefore, its dangers cannot be justified.
. The courts, however, have generally hesitated to extend
strict liability beyond traditional abnormally dangerous activities
such as blasting, storing explosives, and aerial spraying. For
example, one court refused to extend strict liability to well-drill-
ing, holding that only a "few exceptions" qualify as abnormally
dangerous activities.14 Another court similarly refused to extend
strict liability to experimental medical drugs, holding that a
wrongdoer can be held liable only for harms resulting from geo-
graphic proximity to the abnormally dangerous act.15 Thus, case
law suggests that no court would recognize drug dealing as an
abnormally dangerous activity."
Although application of the doctrine of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activity might allow third parties injured
as a result of drug sales to recover from drug dealers, 7 other
factors would bar a drug purchaser from recovering. Those en-
gaged in an abnormally dangerous activity are liable for the
"unexpectable... innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a
third person," but they are not liable to people whose own inten-
tional actions contribute to their injury."8 Thus, the common law
would bar recovery for drug purchasers who, by virtue of a volun-
tary purchase, have assumed the risk of using drugs.
While some courts have found that drug addicts and those
obviously under the influence of a drug have no free will and
thus cannot voluntarily purchase a drug, 9 the majority of courts
1" Trull v Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 NC 687, 692, 142 SE2d 622, 625 (1965).
Recently, one court refused to declare sexual activity transmitting the HIV virus an ab-
normally hazardous activity because it was outside the scope of the doctrine, which covers
activities "such as blasting, storing of inflammable liquids, etc." Doe v Johnson, 817 F
Supp 1382, 1398 (W D Mich 1993).
1" Gaston v Hunter, 121 Ariz 33, 48, 588 P2d 326, 341 (Ariz Ct App 1978).
16 However, as previously noted, a Connecticut court is allowing a drug sale case to
proceed under this theory of recovery. See Prete v Laudano, 1993 WL 21417 (Conn Super
1993). See also note 6 and accompanying text.
" In Prete v Laudano, the plaintiff, a third party, is suing the drug dealer for injuries
inflicted by one of his customers under an ultra-hazardous claim. The plaintiff recently
passed her first hurdle in the case when a Connecticut court rejected the defendant's
pretrial effort to dismiss the case, holding that the plaintiff should be given an opportu-
nity to prove the elements of the tort. Id.
14 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 522-23 (cited in note 8).
" In Flandermeyer v Cooper, 85 Ohio St 327, 98 NE 102 (1912), a pharmacist was
held liable to the wife of a man to whom he had sold morphine. The court held that once
the husband was addicted to the drug "he became merely the instrument, or the conduit
through which this treacherous poison was transferred from the druggist's hands into his
own system." Cooper, 85 Ohio St at 344-45, 98 NE at 106. If a drug addict is viewed as a
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have maintained that all adults are responsible for their ac-
tions.2" Therefore, an adult illegal drug purchaser would most
likely be barred from recovering against a drug dealer in an
abnormally dangerous activity suit. Similarly, underage purchas-
ers could be barred from recovery if the court were to find that
the underage purchasers acted intentionally.21
Thus, the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activity does not allow injured parties fully to recover damages
from a drug dealer. The courts are unlikely to declare drug sales
an "abnormally dangerous activity." Moreover, even if a court
were to find a drug sale to constitute an abnormally dangerous
activity, recovery for resulting injuries might be imperfect: be-
cause adult drug purchasers would properly be barred from re-
covery and third parties would be permitted to recover, underage
purchasers might be unable to recover.
B. Strict Product Liability
Currently, neither a third party nor a drug purchaser can
recover under the common law tort of strict product liability. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines strict product liability as
follows:
One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is
mere "conduit," then he does not voluntarily purchase the drug. In the dram shop context,
some courts have imposed common law liability where a tavern owner continued to pro-
vide alcohol to "obviously intoxicated persons [or] persons in a state of helplessness."
Young v Caravan Corp., 99 Wash 2d 665, 658, 663 P2d 834, 836 (1983). See also El Chico
Corp. v Poole, 732 SW2d 306, 310 (Tex 1987) (holding that an intoxicated person is not
able-minded). A dram shop is a "drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be
drunk on the premises; a bar or saloon." Black's Law Dictionary 494 (West, 6th ed 1990).
'* "[The pharmacist's] duty.., does not encompass protecting against this plaintiff's
own careless actions. Plaintiff was not a minor. She was aware of what she was doing and
even assisted the pharmacist in obtaining the drugs illegally. She was not mentally defi-
cient ... at the time she began soliciting drugs from [the pharmacist. Thus, her compara-
tive fault should not be totally disregarded.]" Clair v Paris Road Drugs, Inc., 573 S2d
1219, 1225 (La App 1991). In one dram shop case, the court maintained that adults
"drunk or sober [are] responsible for their own torts." Williamson v Old Brogue, Inc., 232
Va 350, 353, 350 SE2d 621, 623 (1986). See also Pappas v Clark, 494 NW2d 245, 248
(Iowa Ct App 1992); Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v Todd's Tavern, 813 P2d 508, 510-11
(Okla 1991).
"1 Some courts have explicitly made the distinction between minors and adults. See
Clair v Paris Road Drugs, Inc., 573 S2d at 1225 (denying plaintiff's cause of action but
suggesting it might treat a minor differently); Trujillo v Trujillo, 104 NM 379, 381, 721
P2d 1310, 1312 (NM Ct App 1986).
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subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer,... if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consum-
er without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.22
Applying this rule to illegal drug transactions poses two
problems. First, although illegal drugs are inherently "unreason-
ably dangerous to the ... consumer,"' the Restatement ex-
plains that simply because drugs and other products cannot be
"made entirely safe for all consumption" does not render the pro-
ducer or seller strictly liable. 4 Only when the article sold is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplat-
ed by the ordinary consumer who purchases it" will the product
be deemed unreasonably dangerous.25 Because the ordinary
adult drug consumer presumably knows the dangers posed by the
use of illegal drugs," a drug dealer would only be liable under
this theory if she had sold a drug more dangerous than nor-
mal.27 It is unclear whether the courts would hold that minors,
like adults, can reasonably be expected to know the dangers of
the drug that they purchase.
Second, because courts are loathe to enforce illegal contracts,
they probably would not permit recovery based upon a "defect" in
an item exchanged through an illegal transaction. No cases exist
in which a court has held the seller of any illegal contraband
civilly liable under the tort of strict product liability. A court
would probably decline to extend strict liability to an injured
purchaser (whether underage or adult) of illegal narcotics, or
even to a third party injured by an illegal transaction.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965).
See Tebbett, 134 Drug Topics at 58 (cited in note 11).
24 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (cited in note 22).
25 Id.
2 In another area, one court rejected plaintiffs' claims that cigarettes are abnormally
dangerous where the plaintiffs had developed lung cancer from smoking the defendant's
cigarettes. Gunsalus v Celotex Corp., 674 F Supp 1149, 1158-59 (E D Pa 1987).
27 For example, the drug dealer might be liable if she made marijuana more danger-
ous by lacing it with PCP or if she sold heroin that was significantly more pure than nor-
mal.
"GRAM SHOP" LIABILITY
C. Traditional Common Law Negligence
An injured third party or an underage drug purchaser has
never attempted to recover for injuries from a drug dealer by
alleging traditional common law negligence. Presumably, an
injured party cannot satisfy the elements required to establish
liability under a theory of negligence.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as the
invasion of the interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against uninten-
tional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to
the [injured party], or a class of persons within which
he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion,
and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable
himself from bringing an action for such invasion.2"
This test requires the injured party to prove that the defendant
(1) owed a duty of care to the plaintiff (2) that she breached (3)
which was the legal cause (4) of the harm.29 To serve as the
proximate cause of harm, the harm produced by the actor's con-
duct must not have been "highly extraordinary."3 ° Thus, the
foreseeability of the harm bears upon whether the defendant's
initial action or lack of action was the proximate cause of the
harm, which in turn determines whether the actor was negli-
gent.3'
At common law, a court would not hold a drug dealer liable
for an injury that she inflicted upon an adult drug purchaser.
Even assuming that a drug dealer owed a duty of care to her
customers and that she breached this duty, a court would proba-
bly not view the sale of the drugs as the proximate cause of the
injury; rather, the consumption of the drugs would serve as the
proximate cause of the injury.
Dram shop liability provides a good analogy for examining
liability in illegal drug transactions.32 At common law, tavern
28 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (cited in note 22).
'9 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, and Alfred W. Gans, 2 The American Law of
Torts § 9:1 at 994-95 (Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., Inc., 1985); Edward J. Kionka,
Torts in a Nutshell § 4-3 at 77 (West, 1977).
3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 (cited in note 22).
Kionka, Torts in a Nutshell § 4-2 at 66 (cited in note 29).
32 A dram shop is "[a] drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on
345] -
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owners were not liable for injuries caused by their intoxicated
patrons' actions because "the consumption, not the sale or service
of alcohol, was viewed as the sole proximate cause" of the inju-
ry." The courts deemed the purchaser's own actions as the
cause of any injury to the purchaser.34 Under this rationale, an
adult drug purchaser would be unable to recover from a drug
dealer. It is also likely that a court would bar underage purchas-
ers from recovering under a negligence theory.35
A third party would similarly be barred from recovery for an
injury caused by an illegal drug sale. Under common law dram
shop liability, third parties injured by an intoxicated patron can-
not recover from the tavern owner because their injuries are
deemed unforeseeable. 6 Similarly, in a tort arising out of an
illegal drug transaction, a court would likely hold that an injury
to a third person was too unpredictable for the drug dealer to
foresee. Thus, under a theory of traditional common law negli-
gence, a court would not permit recovery by adult or underage
purchasers or by third parties seeking relief from a drug dealer.
In sum, third party victims and underage purchasers cannot
utilize the tort of common law negligence to recover from drug
dealers for their injuries. Moreover, because no statute currently
provides for this recovery,37 drug dealers need not compensate
these victims for their injuries. To compensate these victims, this
Comment proposes a statute that would require drug dealers to
internalize the costs of injuring third parties or underage pur-
chasers of drugs by imposing upon these dealers liability for
damages.
the premises; a bar or saloon." Black's Law Dictionary at 494 (cited in note 19).
El Chico Corp. v Poole, 732 SW2d 306, 309 (Tex 1987). See also Brigance v Velvet
Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P2d 300, 302 (Okla 1986).
' "The death of the deceased was not 'caused' so much by the wrongful act of the
defendants in selling him whiskey as by his own act in drinking it after being sold to
him." King v Henkie, 80 Ala 505, 510 (1876).
' See Winters v Silver Fox Bar, 71 Haw 524, 536, 797 P2d 51, 56-57 (1990) (holding
that because the minor voluntarily became intoxicated, his mother was barred from recov-
ering from the alcohol provider for an injury resulting from his intoxication); Yancey v
Beverage House of Little Rock, Inc., 291 Ark 217, 723 SW2d 826 (1987).(refusing to modify
the common law bar to recovery in dram shop actions, and holding that even though the
tavern had illegally served the minor who was subsequently involved in an accident, the
minor's acts were the proximate cause of the injuries); Vadasy v Bill Feigel's Tavern, Inc.,
88 Misc 2d 614, 616, 391 NYS2d 32, 34 (NY Sup Ct 1973), afl'd, 391 NYS2d 999 (NY App
Div 1977).
El Chico Corp., 732 SW2d at 309.
3 The one exception is Michigan, which recently enacted a statute to provide for such
recovery. See Mich Comp Laws Ann § 691.160 et seq (West 1994). See also notes 6 and 60.
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II. A PROPOSED STATUTE TO COMPENSATE INJURED THIRD
PARTIES AND UNDERAGE PURCHASERS
This Comment proposes that state legislatures enact statutes
rendering drug dealers civilly liable to innocent victims-third
parties and underage purchasers-for any injury arising from the
dealer's sale of the drugs.38 Under this statute, a third party
could recover from the drug dealer if she could prove (1) that the
drug dealer's illegal drugs were used by the party who injured
her, and (2) that these drugs contributed to the party's action
that resulted in her injury. An underage purchaser could recover
if she could prove that the drug dealer's illegal drugs contributed
to her actions that caused her injury. The proposed statute, how-
ever, would provide no relief to adult drug purchasers; under the
statute, these parties would be deemed voluntarily to have as-
sumed the risks attending drug use.
This statute represents an improvement on the current law
for two reasons. First, it allows the innocent victims of drug
sales-both third parties and underage purchasers-to recover
for their injuries. Currently, third parties must bear the costs of
their injuries unless they are able to recover in an ordinary tort
suit directly from the drug user, who frequently lacks the re-
sources to compensate the victim. Victims are more likely to
receive full compensation from wealthier drug dealers. Underage
drug purchasers and their families would similarly benefit under
the statute. Second, this statute creates the threat of significant
potential liability for drug dealers. The specter of liability might
deter potential drug dealers from selling illegal narcotics, espe-
cially to minors.
A. A Statute Based upon Common Law Principles of Negligence
and Dram Shop Liability
The proposed statute does not represent a dramatic change
in the current state of the law. It merely applies the rationale
behind dram shop laws to the sale of illegal drugs. Dram shop
laws were designed to curb alcohol-related torts by holding bar
owners civilly liable for the actions of their intoxicated patrons,
Alternatively, Congress could enact this as a federal statute rather than the indi-
vidual states taking such action. A federal statute would create uniformity among the
states and allow for a more rapid development of legal precedent. Federal drug laws are
common, and the proposed statute would not be a dramatic departure from traditional
federal drug legislation. Because the proposed statute is modeled after state dram shop
law, however, a state legislature is more likely to enact this model statute.
3451
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thereby curing perceived inadequacies in the common law. 9
Similarly, the proposed statute seeks to deter drug sales and
thus to curb drug-related torts by imposing liability upon the
drug dealers.
The proposed statute would codify a principle inherent in the
modern common law of negligence: one who harms another when
she breaches a duty of care should compensate the victim for her
injuries. State and federal criminal law already establish that
individuals owe a duty to refrain from selling or dealing in illegal
drugs. The proposed statute imposes civil liability upon a drug
dealer who violates this statutory duty and whose sale of narcot-
ics proximately causes injury to an underage purchaser or a third
party.
40
In order to recover, the injured third party or underage pur-
chaser would be required to prove that the drug dealer's narcotics
proximately caused the injury. The proposed statute would re-
quire a third party to establish not only that the drug user who
injured her had used the drug dealer's product, but also that the
drug use actually contributed to injury by increasing the likeli-
hood that the party would injure others.41 Similarly, in order to
3' The first dram shop laws were enacted in the mid-1800s as precursors to the tem-
perance movement. After prohibition, many of these statues were repealed. In the mid-
1970s, state legislatures turned to civil liability to control drunk driving. Daphne D.
Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A Comparative Study, 8
Rev Litig 1, 3-4 (1988).
" This construction tracks the common law notion of negligence per se. Negligence
per se is defined as "[clonduct ... which may be declared and treated as negligence with-
out any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances .... because it
is in violation of a specific statute .... As a general rule, the violation of a public duty,
enjoined by law for the protection of person or property .... constitutes [negligence per
se]." Black's Law Dictionary at 1035 (cited in note 19). Because drug control statutes have
made the sale of certain drugs illegal, a legal duty has been established, and under the
proposed statute any sale would demonstrate negligence and thus render the drug dealer
civilly liable.
This regime would not differ greatly from a strict liability statutory regime. Strict
liability has been defined as "[l]iability without fault." Id at 1422. Under a strict liability
statute, the sale of illegal drugs would also render the drug dealer liable.
" The Michigan statute, "The Drug Dealer Liability Act," does not require an injured
third party to prove that the dealer's drugs were the actual drugs used by the attacker.
Rather, the plaintiff need only establish that "(a) [t]he defendant was participating in the
illegal marketing of the [particular type of drug] at the time the [drug-using actor] ob-
tained or used that [type of drug] [and] (b) [tihe [drug-using actor] obtained or used the
[drug], or caused the injury, within the defendant's market area." Mich Comp Laws Ann §
691.1608 (West 1994). The statute states that any defendant convicted of illegally market-
ing drugs will be "conclusively presumed" to have participated in illegal marketing of the
drug for the two years preceding or following the date of the defendant's participation or
conviction and at the following locations: "in each county in which the defendant resides,
attends school, is employed, or does business[.]" Id. Clearly the Michigan standard is
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recover from the drug dealer, an underage drug user would be re-
quired to prove that her use of drugs increased the likelihood
that she would injure herself.42 Thus, the proposed statute ap-
plies modem common law negligence principles to a contempo-
rary social phenomenon.
This proposed statute models itself after modem dram shop
common law. Current drug control statutes are designed to pro-
tect society from the dangers of drug use. Similarly, alcohol bev-
erage control ("ABC") statutes are designed to prevent drunk
driving and other threats to the general public posed by alcohol
consumption.43 In light of the public policy underlying these
statutes, many courts have held that ABC laws allow third party
victims of intoxicated patrons to recover from tavern owners,
even though the statute itself does not specifically authorize such
recovery." As one court noted: "There seems to be little ratio-
nale to say that it is a crime to [violate alcohol control stat-
utes] ... for which you may be fined and/or imprisoned, but that
you cannot be held civilly liable for doing so." 41 It is similarly
illogical to deny the victim of an illegal drug transaction recovery
from the drug dealer. Thus, a court employing identical reasoning
could interpret existing criminal drug control laws as implicitly
allowing civil recovery for third parties. The proposed statute
would merely apply this line of reasoning to the illegal narcotics
field.
much more lenient than the proposed statute's proximate cause standard.
42 The proposed statute would not require that the alleged drug dealer be convicted of
a drug sale. However, the injured plaintiff would be required to convince the trier of fact
that the defendant had actually sold or given the drugs to the person responsible for the
injury. If the alleged drug dealer were convicted of the drug sale, this task would be sig-
nificantly easier than if she were not convicted.
" Unlike dram shop laws, ABC statutes do not contain specific provisions imposing
civil liability upon an alcohol provider or seller. These statutes explicitly establish only
criminal penalties. However, many courts and commentators use the term "dram shop
statutes" to refer to both ABC laws and true dram shop laws that explicitly provide for
civil liability. See Cuevas v Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 S2d 346, 348 (Miss 1986).
" The Supreme Court of Texas held that "[the safety and well being of... members
of the general public ... is one of the express policies of the Alcoholic Beverage Code ..,"
and established a standard of care for tavern owners in common law negligence claims by
third parties. El Chico Corp. v Poole, 732 SW2d 306, 312 (Tex 1987). The Supreme Court
of Oregon similarly held that one of the Oregon Liquor Control Act's purposes "is to pro-
tect the 'safety' and 'health' of other 'people of the state,' including persons who may be
killed or injured by inebriated minors." Davis v Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 284 Or 351, 356,
587 P2d 75, 77 (1978) (footnote omitted). See also Sipes, 8 Rev Litig at 36 (cited in note
39).
" Montgomery v Orr, 130 Misc 2d 807, 813, 498 NYS2d 968, 973 (NY Sup Ct 1986).
345]
356 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1994:
The proposed statute would also allow underage drug pur-
chasers to recover from drug dealers. The courts presently dis-
agree as to whether state dram shop or alcohol control statutes
allow minors who consume alcohol to recover from alcohol suppli-
ers for their injuries. Some courts have barred such recovery.
These courts have reasoned that because statutes exist that pro-
hibit minors from purchasing alcohol, the minors should be
barred from recovering against the alcohol vendor for the conse-
quences of the minors' own criminal acts." Other courts have
held that because state alcohol control laws are designed to pro-
tect minors, minors should be allowed to recover regardless of
their complicity. Focusing upon the statutes' specific prohibition
on sales to minors, these courts have held that the legislatures
have determined "that minors cannot safely handle alcohol" and
thus have chosen to make minors a protected class.47
These courts have stressed that alcohol providers owe minors
a duty to refrain from selling alcohol to them because minors are
unable to make rational decisions concerning their use of alco-
hol.4 As the Supreme Court of Alaska explained, the state's al-
cohol liquor control statute's purpose in prohibiting sales to mi-
nors
was, in part, to protect minors from the effects of alco-
hol. It was based on an assumption that minors are
"(Wle believe it is inappropriate to use [the ABC statute] as a basis for civil liabil-
ity by licensees to the underage minor. [Another statute] prohibits minors from purchas-
ing or acquiring alcoholic liquor and provides a penalty for the violation (a fine). It would
be inconsistent with apparent legislative policy to reward the violator with a cause of
action based upon his or her conduct which the legislature has chosen to prohibit and
penalize." Miller v City of Portland, 288 Or 271, 279, 604 P2d 1261, 1265 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
"7 Chausse v Southland Corp., 400 S2d 1199, 1203 (La Ct App 1981). See also
Rappaport v Nichols, 31 NJ 188, 201; 156 A2d 1, 8 (1959) ("The Legislature has in explicit
terms prohibited sales to minors as a class because it recognizes their very special suscep-
tibilities and the intensification of the otherwise inherent dangers when persons lacking
in maturity and responsibility partake of alcoholic beverages."); Prevatt v McClennan, 201
S2d 780, 781 (Fla Dist Ct App 1967); Young v Caravan Corp., 99 Wash 2d 665, 660, 663
P2d 834, 837 (1983).
" "A minor by reason of his or her immaturity is not 'ablebodied' to be able to drink
or to make informed judgments .... Therefore, the fault is not so much that of the minor,
but that of the supplier." Montgomery, 130 Misc 2d at 812, 498 NYS2d at 973. "In view of
the legislative determination that minors are incompetent to assimilate responsibly the
effects of alcohol and lack the legal capacity to do so, logic dictates that their consumption
of alcohol does not, as a matter of law, constitute the intervening act necessary to break
the chain of proximate causation and does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who pro-
vides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury." Ely v Murphy, 207 Conn 88, 95,
540 A2d 54, 58 (1988).
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relatively incapable of preventing themselves from
abusing that dangerous drug. It would run counter to
the purpose on which we acted in adopting the statute
as a negligence standard, and thus to the policy of the
statute itself, to hold that a minor is barred from main-
taining an action by his own illegal role in the liquor's
acquisition. As between the seller and the minor, it is
the seller who is the responsible party in the transac-
tion. 9
This line of reasoning also applies to analyzing state and
federal laws prohibiting drug sales. While federal law prohibits
drug sales to both adults and minors, federal law imposes penal-
ties two to three times greater for selling illegal drugs to those
under the age of twenty-one. 0 Also, federal law imposes higher
penalties for selling illegal narcotics around schoolyards and
playgrounds.5 Through these provisions, Congress intended to
protect children by imposing stiffer sanctions to deter drug sales
to children."
This heightened concern about underage drug purchasers
makes sense for two reasons. First, because of their youth, mi-
nors are less able to judge the risks involved in the recreational
use of narcotics. Similar concerns suggest that minors are incapa-
ble of making informed, truly voluntary decisions about alcohol
consumption; thus, their use of alcohol neither constitutes con-
tributory negligence nor breaks the chain of proximate causation.
Under this logic, underage purchasers of illegal drugs should be
allowed to recover civil damages from drug dealers.
4' Morris v Farley Enterprises, Inc., 661 P2d 167, 171 (Alaska 1983).
See 21 USC § 859(a), (b) (West 1988 & Supp 1993) (stating that first offenders are
subject to twice the maximum punishment and parole time for selling to minors as com-
pared to adults, and that second offenders are subject to three times the maximum pun-
ishment and at least three times the maximum parole with a minimum one year impris-
onment). Similarly, California imposes heavier sentences upon defendants convicted of
selling drugs to minors: "If the offense involved a minor who is at least four years younger
than the defendant, the defendant shall, as a full and separately served enhancement to
any other enhancement provided in this subdivision, be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for one, two, or three years, at the discretion of the court." Cal Health and
Safety Code § 11353.1(a)(3) (West 1991).
6' See 21 USC § 860 (West 1988 & Supp 1993) (formerly 21 USC § 845).
82 In explaining the drug-free school zone provision in the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, a district court maintained that the provision
was "designed to protect schoolchildren from the direct and indirect dangers posed by the
narcotics trade [and] 'Congress clearly intended to keep [drugs] out of the easy reach of
school-age children." United States v Cunningham, 615 F Supp 519, 520 (S D NY 1985),
quoting United States v Nieves, 608 F Supp 1147, 1149 (S D NY 1985).
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Second, the inability of minors to evaluate the risks associat-
ed with recreational drug use, coupled with the severe peer pres-
sure on minors to experiment with drugs, makes deterring drug
use by minors more difficult than deterring use among adults."
Because it is more difficult to deter a minor from purchasing and
using drugs, the proposed statute would concentrate on deterring
dealers from selling drugs to minors.
The common law bars adult drug purchasers from recovering
for their injuries, and the proposed statute would continue this
regime. The courts have traditionally barred recovery by an adult
actor for harms caused by her own voluntary illegal actions. For
example, a court refused to allow a wife to recover from a phar-
macist who provided prescription drugs to her husband, who had
illegally forged prescriptions. The court barred recovery because
"'a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to es-
tablish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in
part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to
which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages
based on his own wrong or caused by his own ne-
glect,... or where he must base his cause of action, in
whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the crimi-
nal or penal laws.. .. ""
Similarly, courts have denied recovery to injured, intoxicated
bar patrons under state dram shop statutes, holding that
[t]o allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily
procured a quantity of liquor for his or her own con-
sumption with full knowledge of its possible or probable
"Humans generally have difficulty coping with risk and uncertainty.... [Tihe
probability of occurrence that is placed on a perceived risk is based on how easily the
person can imagine instances of that risk. If an event has not happened to a person, and
he or she cannot associate it with a certain risk, the person may perceive that it will not
happen in the future. This fact is especially true for hazards that are somewhat under the
individual's control, such as alcohol consumption. Adolescents may have greater difficulty
than adults imagining risks associated with alcohol consumption, because they may be-
lieve the risks do not exist, are small, or are not related to them personally .... When
consumers perceive little risk, they tend not to [spend the energy to find out additional in-
formation about the risk.j" Larry T. Patterson, Garland G. Hunnicutt, and Mary Ann
Stutts, Young Adults' Perceptions of Warnings and Risks Associated with Alcohol Con-
sumption, 11 J of Pub Pol and Marketing 96 (1992) (footnotes omitted). An identical argu-
ment can be made concerning underage purchasers' use of drugs.
" Pappas v Clark, 494 NW2d 245, 247 (Iowa Ct App 1992), quoting Cole v Taylor,
301 NW2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981), quoting 1 CJS Actions § 13 at 996-97 (omissions in origi-
nal).
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results "would savor too much of allowing [said] person
to benefit by his or her own wrongful act."55
To permit an adult drug purchaser to recover for injuries
resulting from an illegal drug sale would allow her to benefit
from her own wrongs. Furthermore, granting adult drug purchas-
ers a cause of action would eliminate the deterrent value of im-
posing upon drug purchasers the costs of self-inflicted injuries.
The courts have noted that such a policy in the dram shop con-
text would "be tantamount to creating a no-fault law for intoxi-
cated persons."56 Furthermore, as Oklahoma Supreme Court
Chief Justice Opala has observed, shifting legal liability "tends to
diminish an individual's sense of personal responsibility for the
consequences of his (or her) own conduct. That in turn poses
danger to the public."57
An adult drug user should be held liable for her own actions
because she has the last clear chance to avoid the injury. In the
dram shop context, some courts have utilized this same rationale
to deny injured alcohol consumers recovery from tavern owners
for harm they cause themselves or the general public.58
Although other courts have observed that drug addicts do not
voluntarily purchase drugs and thus are not responsible for their
injuries,59 a drug addict should not be allowed to recover for her
own deliberate, illegal act. Furthermore, if adult drug addicts
were allowed to recover from their dealers, the courts would need
to engage in the time-consuming inquiry of whether the purchas-
er was addicted at the time of the sale. Finally, if drug addicts
were unable to recover for their injuries, a strong incentive would
" Allen v County of Westchester, 109 AD2d 475, 480, 492 NYS2d 772, 776 (NY App
Div 1985) (alteration in original), quoting Buntin v Hutton, 206 Ill App 194, 199 (1917).
See also Bertelmann v Taas Associates, 69 Haw 95, 100, 735 P2d 930, 933 (1987), quoting
Wright v Moffitt, 437 A2d 554 (Del 1985) ("Drunken persons who harm themselves are
solely responsible for their voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law
or statutory basis.").
Allen, 109 AD2d at 479, 492 NYS at 775.
'7 Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v Todd, 813 P2d 508, 518 (Okla 1991) (Opala concur-
ring) (emphasis omitted).
" "As between provider and consumer, the consumer has the last opportunity to
avoid the effect of the alcohol, by not drinking or not driving, and thus as between the
two, the negligence of the consumer is the greater." Sutter v Hutchings, 254 Ga 194, 327
SE2d 716, 719 n 7 (1985).
" The Ohio Supreme Court held that a man addicted to morphine was "merely the
instrument, or the conduit through which this treacherous poison was transferred from
the druggist's hands into his own system." Flandermeyer v Cooper, 85 Ohio St 327, 344-
45, 98 NE 102, 106 (1912). If drug addicts are viewed as a mere "conduit," then they obvi-
ously cannot voluntarily purchase the drugs.
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remain to encourage them to correct their behavior. For all of
these reasons, the proposed statute would bar adult drug pur-
chasers from recovering for their injuries from their dealers. 0
B. Drug Sales as the Proximate Cause of Injury
At common law, a drug dealer probably would not be found
civilly liable for any injury to underage drug purchasers or third
parties because the link between the sale and the injury would
be perceived as tenuous and unforeseeable.61 However, this ra-
tionale is less persuasive today than it was in past years. Ad-
vances in medical knowledge and the public's increased aware-
ness of the effects of drug use on society have made injury result-
ing from drug use more foreseeable.
The proposed statute would adopt the common law notion of
proximate cause and modify it to reflect contemporary values and
knowledge. To establish proximate cause under the common law,
the plaintiff must prove both that the injury was in fact caused
by the sale and that the injury was foreseeable to the defen-
dant.6" In applying this standard, a court should recognize the
wide range of known and foreseeable side effects resulting from
drug use, including convulsions, cardiac failure, cerebral hemor-
rhaging, psychosis, depression, amnesia, and death. 3 Indeed, in
1991, emergency rooms treated over 400,000 people for drug
abuse-related illnesses.' Thus, the possibility that a drug user
might suffer injury as a result of the drug sale is foreseeable.
The Michigan statute, entitled "The Drug Dealer Liability Act," allows some drug
users to recover from their dealers provided that they are drug-free for "6 months before
filing the action ... [and they do] not use [drugs] during the pendency of the action." Mich
Comp Law Ann § 691.1606(2) (West 1994). It is unclear what deterrence effect this provi-
sion has on drug users. The drug purchaser might treat this policy as a safety net, guar-
anteeing an ability to use drugs safely; if the user is truly injured, she can initiate a
claim. Under this view, adult drug users have less incentive to quit.
6 See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
62 See Exxon Corp. v Quinn, 726 SW2d 17, 21 (Tex 1987); Farley v M M Cattle Co.,
529 SW2d 751, 755 (Tex 1975); Elder v Fisher, 247 Ind 598, 605, 217 NE2d 847, 852
(1966) (explaining that to establish proximate cause, the injury "need be only a natural
and probable result [of a negligent act]; and the consequence be one which in the light of
the circumstances should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated").
Tebbett, 134 Drug Topics at 58 (cited in note 11).
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1992 348 (1992), citing United States
Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Annual
Emergency Room Data, 1991 16, Statistical Series I, Number 11-A (1992). In 1991, 48,807
children between the ages of six and seventeen were admitted to emergency rooms for
drug abuse related symptoms. Id.
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Recognizing this change in public awareness, most jurisdic-
tions addressing this issue have held drug dealers and suppliers
criminally liable under the felony-murder rule for the drug-relat-
ed deaths of their customers.65 In these cases, the courts have
held that the customer's death from use of the drug is not so
unforeseeable as to break the causal link between the drug sale
and the user's death.66 Some courts have even held that the
drug purchaser's subsequent use of the drug should be considered
"at most to be concurrent [with the sale] rather than an indepen-
dent intervening cause."67 In this area of criminal law, the sale
of the drug is the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Moreover, in common law negligence actions, some courts
have viewed a person addicted to a legal drug as having no free
will and becoming "merely the instrument, or the conduit
through which [the] treacherous poison was transferred from the
druggist's hands into his own system."6 In dram shop cases,
similar arguments have been advanced concerning alcoholics.6"
Under this view of addiction, the drug dealer has directly and
immediately caused injury by providing the illegal narcotic to the
addict. Even under a less extreme interpretation, the purchaser's
ultimate use of the drug would not sever the causal chain be-
tween the drug sale and the injury because the drug's subsequent
use is eminently foreseeable.7 °
A third party's injury resulting from the sale of drugs is
similarly foreseeable. Drugs affect judgment, motor reflexes, and
' See Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: The Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the
Supply of Drugs, 20 Ga L Rev 671 n 2 (1986).
" Commonwealth v Catalina, 407 Mass 779, 791, 556 NE2d 973, 980 (1990); State v
-Ervin, 242 NJ Super 584, 590, 577 A2d 1273, 1276 (1990) (finding constitutional a statute
making any person who distributes a drug liable for a death resulting from its use, be-
cause the statute is limited to "the proximate consequences of inherently dangerous illegal
activities").
67 State v Thomas, 118 NJ Super 377, 380, 288 A2d 32, 34 (1972).
Flandermeyer v Cooper, 85 Ohio St 327, 344-45, 98 NE 102, 106 (1912); Holleman v
Harward, 119 NC 150, 156, 25 SE 972, 975 (1896) (holding that plaintiffs wife's addiction
to opium was "the direct result of the use of the drug, which the [pharmacists] sold to
her").
6 "An intoxicated person is by definition not an able-bodied nor able-minded person."
El Chico Corp. v Poole, 732 SW2d 306, 310 (Tex 1987). See Bailey v Black, 183 W Va 74,
76-77, 394 SE2d 58, 60-61 (W Va 1990) ("[If the buyer is an alcoholic, the seller may be
feeding his addiction, which is an ongoing harm to the drunk himself.").
70 "Concerning proximate causation, we find no distinction as does the old common
law view, between the voluntary consumption of alcoholic beverages and the sale of the
beverages in the chain of causation." Brigance v Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P2d
300, 305 (Okla 1986) (emphasis omitted). See also Prevatt v McClennan, 201 S2d 780, 781
(Fla Dist Ct App 1967).
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coordination, thereby leading to accidents that can injure the
drug user or a third party.7' Drug use also incites secondary
crime. In 1989, 25 percent of the inmates convicted of violent
crimes were under the influence of illegal drugs when they com-
mitted their offenses.72
Moreover, as with alcohol abuse, drug abuse increases the
likelihood of accidents. Parallel reasoning about the widely-
known dangers of alcohol has led some courts to reject the com-
mon law bar to third parties' recovery from dram shops when an
intoxicated patron injures them. For example, as the Texas Su-
preme Court explained:
In addressing foreseeability, we know by common
knowledge that alcohol distorts perception, slows reac-
tion, and impairs motor skills, while operation of an
automobile requires clear perception, quick reaction and
adept motor skills.73
Similarly, drugs can affect the body in ways identical to alcohol
and create identical threats to the general public. Reversing the
traditional common law ban on dram shop recovery, the courts
have frequently emphasized the increased public awareness of
the dangers of alcohol.74 The law should similarly recognize the
increase in public and scientific knowledge about the dangers of
drug use. Thus, the proposed statute would properly regard drug
sales as a potential legal cause of injury.
Tebbett, 134 Drug Topics at 58 (cited in note 11). These symptoms are especially
symptomatic of LSD use. "Although it is thought to be impossible to overdose on LSD,
deaths attributed to accidents while the individuals were under the influence of the drug
are relatively common." Id.
72 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1992 at 603 (cited in note 64), citing fig-
ures from Bureau of Justice Statistics, Profile of Jail Inmates 1989, Special Report NCJ-
129097 8 (1991). More than 24 percent of the inmates convicted of sexual assault and
more than 19 percent of the inmates convicted of homicide were under the influence of
illegal drugs when they committed these offenses. Id.
7 El Chico Corp., 732 SW2d at 311.
7 "[Miodern analyses have discarded the absolute rule of no liability in favor of an
approach incorporating current legal understanding as dictated by conditions and circum-
stances of modern society." Id at 310. See also Rappaport v Nichols, 31 NJ 188, 202, 156
A2d 1, 8 (1959) ("[T]he unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor [who was served
alcohol] or the intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling public may readily
be recognized and foreseen.").
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C. The Irrelevance of Assumption of Risk to Recovery Under the
Proposed Statute
The common law denies recovery to a plaintiff who has "con-
ducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an action for
such invasion."75 Thus, even where a defendant acted recklessly
or negligently, a plaintiff who voluntarily assumed a risk of being
harmed by the defendant's actions is normally barred from recov-
ery.7
8
Because third parties have assumed no risk, they would not
be barred from recovery under this common law principle. Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, the proposed statutes also permit
these parties to recover for their injuries.
Similarly, underage purchasers would be allowed to recover
under the statute. Like third parties, underage purchasers do not
assume a risk of injury when they purchase and consume illegal
narcotics from the drug dealer. In the dram shop context, courts
have denied recovery to adult patrons who purchased and con-
sumed alcohol because adults "implicitly acknowledge" and as-
sume the risks inherent in consuming alcohol.77 However, this
common law principle does not extend to minors who, because of
their age,
can neither appreciate nor willingly assume the risk
involved [in drinking alcohol and] will not be taken to
have exposed [themselves] to the risk of harm that
arises from the tavernkeeper's negligent conduct.7"
Under this view, underage drug purchasers also do not "will-
ingly assume the risk involved"79 in purchasing and using drugs.
Therefore, while adult drug purchasers' claims would fail under
7" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (cited in note 22).
7' Id at § 496A.
71 "An imbiber who drinks intoxicants on the premises implicitly acknowledges the
possibility that the tavern owner may negligently continue to serve him liquor even
though he has become inebriated and accident-prone while in that condition." Ohio Casu-
alty Insurance Co. v Todd's Tavern, 813 P2d 508, 517 (Okla 1991) (Opala concurring).
78 Id. "In view of the legislative determination that minors are incompetent to assimi-
late responsibly the effects of alcohol and lack the legal capacity to do so, logic dictates
that their consumption of alcohol does not, as a matter of law, constitute the intervening
act necessary to break the chain of proximate causation and does not, as a matter of law,
insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury." Ely v Mur-
phy, 207 Conn 88, 95, 540 A2d 54, 58 (1988). In other words, the court held that a minor
is unable to assume the risk and thereby break the casual chain between the alcohol pro-
vider and the subsequent damages.
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 813 P2d at 517.
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the proposed statute because of their assumption of the risk,
underage purchasers, who by their nature are incapable of volun-
tarily assuming these risks, would be allowed to recover.
In sum, the proposed statute does not deviate from the prin-
ciples established in modern common law negligence and dram
shop cases. Instead, the proposed statute merely updates the
doctrines to reflect modern realities. Drug dealers' sales of nar-
cotics violate their duty of care to minors and to the general pub-
lic when they cause foreseeable injuries for which the minors and
third parties assumed no risk.
III. THE LEGISLATURE, NOT THE COURTS, SHOULD ESTABLISH
CIVIL LIABILITY
Because the proposed statute merely incorporates modern
common law principles, the courts could theoretically modify the
existing common law and extend recovery to underage purchasers
and third parties without legislative action. Nevertheless, the
legislature is better positioned to establish this new cause of
action.
As shown in Part I, the courts have been reluctant to inter-
pret the common law to allow recovery from a drug dealer for
injuries to third parties or underage purchasers. While many
courts now recognize common law actions in dram shop cases,
other courts have continued to adhere to the traditional common
law prohibition on recovery in those cases. Some courts that have
refused to establish common law civil liability for alcohol vendors
have argued that the legislature is better able to reach this deci-
sion. For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that impos-
ing civil liability under dram shop requires a determination of
"what best serves the societal interest and need[,]" and it posited
that "the legislature is best equipped to handle [this public policy
decision]. "' ° Other courts have refused to modify the traditional
common law bar on civil recovery in dram shop cases because
they consider the legislature better able than the judiciary to
limit and define new causes of action.8'
Additionally, legislative decisions more legitimately and
effectively represent society's moral position on an issue. 2 The
' Ling v Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan 629, 640, 703 P2d 731, 739 (1985). See also Holmes
v Circo, 196 Neb 496, 504-05, 244 NW2d 65, 70 (1976).
"l Yancey v Beverage House of Little Rock, Inc., 291 Ark 217, 218, 723 SW2d 826, 827
(1987); Holmes, 196 Neb at 504-05, 244 NW2d at 70.
12 For example, declaring an area a "nuclear free-zone" has no practical impact but
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proposed civil liability statute represents a moral decision to hold
drug dealers responsible for the injuries caused by their illegal
activities. When confronted with these same problems in the
dram shop context, many states have recognized the inadequacies
of the common law and have enacted statutes providing civil
recovery for those injured by intoxicated patrons of taverns rath-
er than allowing the courts to alter, the common law on a piece-
meal basis.' Thus, the legislature is the appropriate body to
effectuate the policy choice holding drug dealers responsible for
compensating innocent victims.
CONCLUSION
Current law fails to hold drug dealers fully responsible for
the damage they cause through their illegal drug trade. There-
fore, the various state legislatures or Congress should enact a
statute to recognize the duty of drug dealers not to harm the
general public and minors. This statute would merely codify
principles inherent in modem common law negligence and dram
shop actions. It would require drug dealers whose sales injure a
third party or an underage purchaser to compensate these par-
ties for their injuries.
The proposed statute would deter drug dealers by requiring
them to internalize the full cost of their trade. It would also
maintain the common law bar on recovery for adult purchasers of
illegal drugs to preclude them from benefitting from their volun-
tary illicit conduct. Moreover, the statute would supplement law
enforcement by creating additional incentives to the victims of
drug sales to identify drug dealers. Finally, innocent victims of
drug sales, both third parties and underage purchasers, would be
less likely to suffer the physical and economic consequences of
narcotics trafficking because they would possess a reasonable
chance of recovering damages from the drug dealers responsible
for their injuries.
does allow a community to state its position on nuclear weapons.
' See Sipes, 8 Rev Litig at 1, 3-6 (cited in note 39).
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